By Andrew Kwon
Presidents Obama and Park inspect an honor guard in Seoul on April 25, 2014. The U.S. role in facilitating sustainable South Korea-Japan relations will shape the future political environment in Northeast Asia. Source: Korea.net’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.
No doubt on the agenda of President Obama’s recent trip to Northeast Asia was a push to develop closer South Korea-Japan relations. However, given the range and depth of issues involved, the road ahead is fraught with risk which requires deep consideration for not only the desired outcome, but the steps to take. As a first step, President Obama and the U.S. government should publicly articulate the importance of South Korean and Japanese reconciliation for the future of the Asia Pacific. Through emphasizing the need for a stable undercurrent of inter-governmental communication, and the benefits it would hold to their security, the United States can help both sides achieve lasting comity.
If anything was achieved by recent South Korean and Japanese Director-General level talks on the comfort women issue, agreement was at least reached to meet regularly in order to resolve the issue. The result highlighted that while there was an understanding on both sides that the issue needed to be addressed, it was unlikely to be resolved any time soon. However, that is not to say that U.S. pressure will let up.
This recent meeting marked the second occasion in 2014 where a South Korea-Japan Director-General level meeting has occurred after interactions with major figures in the Obama administration. The first occurring in February following Secretary Kerry’s Asia tour and the most recent organized after the Trilateral meeting with President Obama, President Park and Prime Minister Abe at The Hague in late March. However, though both the Japanese and South Korean governments are aware of the U.S. desires to see historical differences addressed, the relationship mended and moving forward, the obstacles towards this goal cannot be overlooked.
Though prominent voices, such as Dr. Victor Cha in his book Alignment despite Antagonism, have long expounded the merits and potential of enhanced cooperation between two major U.S. allies, the pros of the end product are matched only by the difficulty that reconciling territorial disputes and legacy issues entails. As it stands, the veritable minefield of issues that constitute a great deal of South Korea-Japan relationship means considerable care is needed for even basic interactions. This leads to a disconnect between the desire for progress and the speed with which it can be achieved.
In addition, even after hypothetical reconciliation, there still comes the task of reaching agreement on what act or acts constitutes ‘closure.’ Whether closure means a series of apologies, monetary compensation, symbolic gestures, or a mixture of all three, neither Japan or South Korea (or both) are likely to come away unscathed without at least some domestic dissatisfaction. This raises the question, is there a win-win scenario?
Rather than hoping, the United States could look at options that will pave the way to sustainable and functional relations in the long term, such as insuring a stable baseline in the relationship even amidst tension. Though this task may not be glamorous, given how quickly comments made by politicians and government appointees on the periphery can quickly blow out of proportion and further unravel relations; it is an important task, deceptively difficult, but completely worthwhile. One suggestion would be to encourage Japan and South Korea to realize the danger in pulling apart the lines of communication that exist between their respective governments whenever relations breakdown. If the reality of South Korea-Japan relations going forward means there will always be dissonance as a result of historical issues, it should mean that inter-state interaction from the bottom up should be strengthened not degraded — particularly in instances where an incident requires both states to undertake comprehensive dialogue to mitigate the negative side-effects and reach a mutually beneficial conclusion.
However, a push towards a stable baseline in South Korea-Japan relations with the overarching goal of making it both sustainable and lasting requires active U.S. involvement in shaping the narrative. In addition to articulating a strategic vision of the United States in the Asia-Pacific and the critical importance of South Korea-Japan relations within it, the United States must invest both the time and resources to frequently raise the positives of closer relations, influencing the domestic discourse in both countries and, in effect, diluting the prominence of historical issues. As such, in the absence of a clear understanding of the importance of South Korea-Japan relations, let alone active public advocacy, there is a not only a lack of incentive to deepen relations, but also a disincentive to move beyond antagonism.
Ultimately, even if a narrative begins encouraging closer relations, the size, scale and complexity of associated problems in South Korea-Japan relations, highlighted again by the South Korean reaction to Prime Minister Abe’s recent offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine, will remain considerable challenges. However, the United States should still take heart from at least one positive sign from recent events; unlike in February, South Korea did not downplay the importance of these recent talks. Building on the mutual recognition of the importance of the relationship would be a solid place to start.
Mr. Andrew Kwon is a Visiting Thawley Scholar from the Lowy Institute with the Korea Chair at CSIS.
