By Bruno Hellendorff & Truong-Minh Vu

Vietnamese fisherman operating in the South China Sea. Jepoirrier’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.

Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung this week will lead a high-level delegation on a tour of three European countries and the Vatican. In addition to discussions on economic cooperation, security will also be on the agenda, with a focus on the South China Sea disputes and regional maritime security. These issues have been determined as a priority in Vietnam-European Union (EU) cooperation by Vietnamese leaders, especially after China placed an oil rig off the coast of Vietnam last May.

Vietnam is not the only ASEAN country party to disputes in the South China Sea which considers the EU a critical external partner. On his trip to Brussels in September, Philippine president Benigno Aquino tried to seek support for his country’s position with regard to China’s actions in the South China Sea. There are at least three reasons behind this quest for EU support among ASEAN states. They indicate that the EU can indeed play a key role in the stability of the South China Sea.

First, the EU has considerable economic stake in the South China Sea, through which most of Europe’s trade with East Asia transits. The EU is also China’s prime export market, a status Southeast Asian countries see as providing potentially important leverage over Beijing.

Second, the EU, due to its own history and character, is a staunch defender of international law, “effective multilateralism,” and the rule of law in settling international disputes. It hosts the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, as well as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. All three bodies are central to the settlement of disputes under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea , which all countries party to the South China Sea dispute have signed. The Philippines-China case initiated by Manila in January 2013 is emblematic of the importance of such arbitration mechanisms in a context where all parties seek the moral high ground.

Finally, recent initiatives by the EU indicate its willingness to further engage the region on political and security grounds. The year 2012 was a landmark in that respect: Brussels published “guidelines” for its East Asia policy, acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), signed a Program of Action in Brunei to implement its “enhanced partnership” with ASEAN, issued a joint communiqué with the United States on the Asia Pacific, and stepped up its diplomatic presence in the region. Summits and high-level visits have also gained substance and political commitment, after a period of relative neglect.

The EU should not be expected to play a meaningful military role in East Asia. It has neither the resources, nor the will, to deploy forces in such a distant and volatile theater. Moreover, the EU bases its own understanding of the situation on a non-confrontational platform. Brussels considers its engagement with ASEAN as strategic in scope and has a strategic partnership with China. Nevertheless, there are two areas in which EU-ASEAN cooperation can have a distinct added value: defending the rule of law and harnessing exchanges based on the EU experiences.

The South China Sea has recently witnessed renewed activism by states involved in the disputes. Chinese moves, which include the dispatch of an oil rig to the Paracels and the construction undertaken in the Spratly, have been of concern to regional countries and international observers alike. These developments pose a challenge to the normative order that underpinned East Asia’s stability in recent decades. It contradicts two pillars of this order: the freedom of navigation in the area and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, as laid out in the TAC.

For those countries relying on UNCLOS to check China’s ambitions, the EU’s interpretation and support of rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes has a symbolic and political impact that could hardly be achieved otherwise.

Knowledge transfer from Europe is another asset sought by Southeast Asian countries. The EU can share best practices in conflict prevention and management, and in the implementation of policies such as the EU’s fisheries policy. Nations along the South China Sea can learn from the European experience in joint exploitation of natural resources, as was done in the eastern and western North Atlantic regions. EU-ASEAN cooperation in maritime security can greatly benefit all partners, linking policymakers to the business community, academia, and a broader base through people-to-people diplomacy.

Building a normative and rules-based order in the South China Sea is a long-term investment and engagement that will require innovative solutions and patience from all sides. The EU and ASEAN share a similar strategic interest in achieving this goal in the South China Sea.

Mr. Bruno Hellendorff is a Research Fellow at the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security in Brussels. Mr. Truong-Minh Vu is a foreign affairs and political analyst focusing on Southeast Asia and a lecturer at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The opinions expressed are the authors’ own.