Senator John McCain will give the keynote address at the CSIS Conference of the South China Sea in a few moments. You can watch his remarks live below:

UPDATE: This event has concluded. You can view Senator McCain’s remarks and answers to questions from the attendees above. The senator’s full remarks, as prepared for delivery, follow below:

Thank you, John [Hamre], for that generous introduction, and for your friendship over many years. It is always great to return to CSIS, which does so much to inform America’s thinking about the world and our leadership in it.

As many of you know, I recently returned from Southeast Asia, and before I turn to the topic of this conference, I’d like to offer some brief impressions from my visit to Burma. It was the first time I had been allowed to return to the country in 15 years, which is one indication that this new civilian government could represent a change from the past. Another noteworthy change was the new capital of Nay Pyi Taw. Massive government buildings, marble-strewn palaces, brand new hotels, 18-lane highways – and the strange thing about it: no one is there. Ours were the only cars on the road. The buildings were nearly empty.

It was a dislocating experience. And it certainly was a sad contrast with the crushing poverty in Rangoon. I visited a private AIDS clinic that was overflowing with people, many orphaned children, who need more care than is available. I went to a service that offers free funerals for departed souls whose families are too poor to provide their loved ones with the dignity of a decent burial. It breaks your heart, and it makes you wish the government would devote similar levels of enthusiasm and resources to the development of their nation as the construction of their capital.

Nonetheless, in my meetings with the First Vice President, the two Speakers of Parliament, and others, it was clear that this government wants better relations with the United States. I stressed that my government and I share this aspiration, and that such a feat is not impossible. After all, if the United States and Vietnam can improve relations, which I know a thing or two about, anything is possible.

However, the main point I stressed is that any improvement of relations would need to be built not on happy talk, but on actions by both sides. The United States should be willing to put every aspect of our policy on the table, and to make tangible changes that the government in Nay Pyi Taw asks of us. But this can only be done in conjunction with concrete actions on their part, especially those steps called for by the U.N. Human Rights Council: releasing all prisoners of conscience; providing the Red Cross unfettered access to all prisons; commencing a real process of national reconciliation that involves ethnic and political opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy; and guaranteeing the safety and freedom of movement of Aung San Suu Kyi.

I had the opportunity to see the Lady on my visit, and the reason I remain hopeful for the Burmese people has a lot to do with her. Yesterday was Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday, and she expressed this hope: ‘If I were asked what I would wish on my birthday, I wish for peace, stability and prosperity in the country.’ This amazing lady remains an inspiration to her people, and to me. And I agree with her that this is not the time for the United States to lift sanctions. We should also work to establish a U.N. Commission of Inquiry, which has nothing to do with retribution and everything to do with truth and justice for the Burmese people.

From Burma I went to Singapore for the Shangri La Dialogue, where one of the main topics of discussion was the subject of this conference: maritime security in the South China Sea. This issue inspires intense emotions among the states with competing claims to these waters and territories. And the circle of experts who truly understand the historical and legal intricacies of these claims is rather small. I am from Arizona, where we know how complex it can be to fight over water and land use. I am also an old Navy man who has spent much of my life traveling and working on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. And I am increasingly concerned that the South China Sea is becoming a flashpoint of conflict.

The past few years have seen a rapid escalation of tensions between states in this volatile and disputed maritime region. I need not review all of these incidents for this audience. Of course, it is important for all parties to practice restraint. And to be sure, our ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) partners will need to make compromises, especially among one another, to reach a peaceful and mutually beneficial outcome, as many of them would acknowledge. That said, this situation requires a little straight talk: One of the main forces exacerbating tensions in the South China Sea, and making a peaceful resolution of these disputes harder to achieve, is the aggressive behavior of China and the unsubstantiated territorial claims that it seeks to advance.

I take no pleasure in saying this. I believe one of the foremost U.S. national interests is the maintenance and enhancement of productive relations with China. I want China to succeed and to develop peacefully. And I believe there is no force of history that condemns our countries to conflict. Indeed, the scope of our global cooperation is broader than ever before, including on issues of maritime security, which is plain for all to see in our common operations off the Horn of Africa.

What troubles me, and I imagine many of you, are the expansive claims that China makes in the South China Sea; the rationale offered for these claims, which has no basis in international law; and the increasingly assertive actions that China is taking to enforce its self-described rights, including in waters within 200 miles off the coast of ASEAN countries, as was the case recently in separate incidents involving Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s so-called ‘nine-dotted lines’ map claims all of the islands in the South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory and all of their territorial waters as China’s exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, certain Chinese interpretations of international law would erode the long-standing principle of freedom of navigation – twisting it from a concept of inclusion that fosters open access, to a concept of exclusion that would restrict access. Some in China are even referring to this doctrine as, quote, ‘legal warfare.’”

Why should this matter to the United States? This is a question that many Americans will ask, especially when we are committed to three conflicts already, and when our national debt has literally become unsustainable. Why should America care about the maritime disputes of foreign nations half a world away?

There are certainly economic reasons for remaining engaged. The South China Sea region is an important source of jobs and natural resources that benefit many Americans. However, perhaps the larger consideration is the strategic one. The world’s geopolitical center of gravity is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region – a region in which many states are rising at once in wealth and power. This creates friction between them where old disputes remain unresolved. The United States has a national security interest in maintaining a favorable strategic balance in this vital region. And central to that is defending the universal freedom of navigation and open access to the seas as a foundational principle of the international order.

Efforts to deny freedom of navigation in the South China Sea pose a serious challenge to the rules-based international order that the United States and our allies have sustained over many decades. If these efforts were to succeed – if persistent bullying enabled one state to impose its territorial claims by force and to turn the South China Sea into a virtual no-go zone for the commercial and military vessels of other nations, including the United States – the effects would be dire. It could set a dangerous precedent for weakening international law in ways that ill-intentioned actors would no doubt apply elsewhere. It could create a troubling incentive for rising powers everywhere to take by force what peaceful, legal means cannot secure for them. And it would bring us closer to a day when the U.S. Navy judges that it can no longer safely access and operate in the western Pacific.

What, then, should the U.S. do? Let me offer a few suggestions in closing.

First, regarding the U.S. position on the South China Sea, we should recognize that, where possible, a policy of clarity may be more stabilizing than a policy of ambiguity. I applaud Secretary Clinton for stating that rival claims in the South China Sea should be resolved through multilateral negotiations, and that we will seek to facilitate those negotiations. Most Asian states welcomed that statement. Ultimately, this is about China’s relations with its neighbors, not China and the United States. Nonetheless, it is helpful for us to continue clarifying the U.S. position, so other countries know where possible which claims the United States accepts, which ones we do not, and what actions we are prepared to take to support our policies and partners, especially the Philippines, which is a treaty ally.

Second, the United States should assist our ASEAN partners in resolving their own disputes in the South China Sea as a means of fostering greater ASEAN unity vis-à-vis China. China seeks to exploit the divisions among ASEAN members – to play them off each other to press its own agenda. Resolving the competing maritime claims among ASEAN states, as Malaysia and Brunei have recently done, would enable our partners to establish a more united front.

Third, the United States needs to help our ASEAN partners to build up their maritime defense and detection capabilities – to develop and deploy basic systems such as early warning radar and coastal security vessels. Remedying this lack of capacity, and enhancing our joint exercises, would provide for a more common operational picture in the South China Sea and a better ability to respond to threats.

Fourth, the U.S. Senate needs to take a hard look at the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. I know this is unpopular among some conservatives. I have had doubts about it myself. But the fact is, successive administrations of both parties have adhered to the Convention’s basic strictures, and done so without a seat at the table. Meanwhile, states like China are working within the Convention to advance fringe views that aim to deny access to international waters. This leaves the United States to rely on the good graces of foreign powers and its own superior force to ensure U.S. rights of navigation. But these conditions cannot be taken for granted, which is why the U.S. Navy strongly supports the Convention and the added legal guarantees it offers to our naval operations. Thus, for national security reasons, the Senate needs to decide whether it is finally time to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty.

Fifth, we need to shift U.S. regional force posture to put greater emphasis on emerging areas of competition, especially the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. I have joined with my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, Senators Carl Levin and Jim Webb, in calling for a timeout to reevaluate our basing plans in Japan and Guam. And I have done so not to withdraw America from Asia, but to enhance our commitment to regional security. It is not Congress’s place to devise regional basing arrangements, but as new realities and cost overruns call our current plans into question, Congress must ask the hard questions. Our goal should be to move toward a more geographically dispersed force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, as Secretary Gates has described, and a centerpiece of that effort will always be our basing commitments with our historic allies, Japan and Korea.

Finally, the United States must continue to make the necessary investments in our defense capabilities, especially naval forces, in order to remain the world’s leading military power. We are now facing enormous domestic pressures to cut spending, including defense spending, and some reductions are certainly necessary. Reasonable people can disagree about how deep those cuts should be. But when the President pledged recently to cut $400 billion in defense spending over 12 years – with no strategic rationale for why this figure was chosen or what risks it would entail, and with the Secretary of Defense only being told about it the day beforehand – I think reasonable people could also agree that this is no way to plan for our national defense. We must be guided by strategy, not arbitrary arithmetic.

The events now unfolding in the South China Sea will play a decisive role in shaping the development of the Asia-Pacific region in this century. And the United States must remain actively engaged in that process. In this regard, I am troubled by recent statements made by some of my colleagues in Congress and some of the Republican presidential candidates, suggesting a desire to withdraw from the world and reduce our commitments abroad. America has made that mistake before, and we should learn from this history, not repeat it. After all, history shows us that Americans themselves are the greatest beneficiaries of the rules-based international order that is upheld by U.S. power and leadership. We abdicate that role at the world’s peril, and our own.

If those of you visiting from the Asia-Pacific region only take one message home with you, let it be this: There has always been an isolationist trend in the United States, but Americans have rejected it before, and I believe they will reject it again now. There will always be a solid base of support in America for a strong internationalist foreign policy. That isn’t going anywhere, and neither is America. We will not withdraw or be pushed out of the Asia-Pacific region. We will stay engaged there, committed to our friends and allies, and together we will succeed.