By Hiroyasu Akutsu —

In December 2013, while North Korea’s Kim Jong Un regime was purging Jang Song Thaek, Japan’s Shinzo Abe administration established a National Security Council (NSC) and released Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS) as well as the administration’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Meanwhile, since the start of the Kim Jong Un regime, North Korea has strengthened its missile and nuclear capabilities, institutionalized its status as a nuclear weapons state, and maintained a belligerent military posture toward the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

China’s rise is shaping the balance of influence on the Korean Peninsula, requiring Japan to review its strategy for North Korea. While China has begun to mitigate the possibility of instability in North Korea by toughening its stance, it has also intensified its “charm offensive” toward South Korea. The so-called South Korea-China “honeymoon”, although limited, coupled with the deterioration of the diplomatic atmosphere between Japan and South Korea due to history issues, adds another challenge to Japan’s North Korea strategy.

Japan’s North Korea strategy has been consistent and stable for the past twelve years, but Japan has to make necessary tactical adjustments because of the growth of North Korea’s military capabilities as well as China’s rise and its influence on the Korean Peninsula. It is necessary for Japan to recalibrate its existing policy toward North Korea in light of its new National Security Strategy.

Table 1: Japan’s Policy Responses to North Korea’s Belligerence

Here I will focus on one challenge facing Japan’s defense planners and policy-makers: strengthening deterrence of North Korea through progress on three narrow issues.

1) Solving the overdue issue of Japan’s right to collective self-defense

First, Japan should solve the long-overdue issue of its right to collective self-defense. This issue can be solved either by changing the Liberal Democratic Party’s existing interpretation of the right or through constitutional revisions. The latter will be time-consuming. From the viewpoint of strategic efficiency, an interpretation change is more desirable. Prime Minister Abe appears willing to utilize this option.

Japan’s resolution of this issue should be welcomed by South Korea. Since the mid-1990s, Track 2 security experts in Japan and South Korea have discussed this issue intensively and have even conducted simulations in the wake of North Korea’s conventional and nuclear threats. These discussions and exercises have helped leading South Korean security intellectuals to understand the importance of Japan having this right. There is no reason that new generations of South Korean intellectuals should be unable to understand how helpful Japan could be to supporting the U.S.-South Korea alliance, Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral security cooperation, and Japan-South Korea bilateral security cooperation.

2) Enhancing Japan’s own response and deterrence capabilities

Second, Japan is trying to enhance its own capabilities to respond to North Korea’s missile threat. The new NDPG states the following:

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary.

Japan is still studying this capability, but Japan should move more swiftly to develop its missile defense capability as North Korea develops its missile programs. This would help to further strengthen U.S. extended deterrence.

3) Further enhancing BMD

Third, the further enhancement of Japan’s role in the U.S.-led BMD initiative will strengthen both Japan’s overall defense capability and the U.S. extended deterrent, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Northeast Asia. In recent years, Japan has made progress in developing its capabilities to play an appropriate role in this initiative. The new NDPG states that Japan will increase the current number of Aegis ships from six to seven and introduce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement. Japan should continue these efforts to keep up with North Korean missile development.

Japan should continue to focus on efforts to strengthen its capabilities and roles in its security cooperation with the United States and South Korea while striving to enhance its own defense capabilities. Progress on deterrence is a key factor in the adjustment of Tokyo’s policy toward North Korea.

Dr. Hiroyasu Akutsu is a senior fellow and professor at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and a visiting scholar with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Akutsu’s essay is part of CSIS’s Strategic Japan Working Paper Series featuring Japanese scholars addressing pressing issues in Japanese foreign policy. He can be contacted at akutsu-hr@nids.go.jp.