By Bai Jie
Source: Hlvaooij’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.
On January 19, DPRK’s Vice Foreign Minister and Representative to the Six-Party Talks Ri Yong Ho had an unofficial meeting with former U.S. special representative for North Korea policy Stephen Bosworth in Singapore. Is it another opportunity for the United States and the DPRK to ease their long-term tensions?
The first weekend of 2015 passed by with a continuously heavy drizzle. While flipping through the “Express,” the free tabloid-style newspaper published by the Washington Post, I unexpectedly found that a D.C. movie theater was still actually showing The Interview!
Even though the actual translation of the title in Chinese is “The Interview,” the Chinese mass media chose a more sensational one: “The Assassination of Kim Jong-un.” Affixed to the front of the notice was a small ad: “The most controversial film in years.” This hitherto unreleased film has managed to trigger new rounds of intense cyber-conflict, a war of words, and an uproar between the United States and the DPRK.
After the release of The Interview’s trailer, Sony Pictures Entertainment, the film’s producer, began to face strong protests from the DPRK. At the end of December, Sony Pictures suffered a cyberattack and “went dark,” which caused it to announce the cancellation of all screenings in theaters. U.S. officials immediately condemned DPRK as the party behind the attack; the subsequent ramifications are still brewing. Starting on December 23, 2014, the entire internet capability of DPRK was taken offline for eight days. DPRK condemned the United States for being the mastermind. On January 2, 2015, President Barack Obama signed an executive order to authorize a new round of sanctions on the DPRK, specifically targeting three defense organizations and ten key individuals thought to be involved.
From a business perspective, this should be a profitable endeavor. That is the precise reason why Sony Pictures selected such a sensitive theme, banking on the possibility that it might lead to controversy. Despite the elimination of the general theatrical release, Sony Pictures has made about $15 million thus far, both from digital sales on cable and satellite TV, in addition to over 500 independent cinemas, who have also contributed their fair share. The West End Cinema is one of those, and the only cinema screening this movie in all of D.C. Technically speaking, this film is fairly low-quality, with a simple plot and crude humor. Evidently, the film has even been nominated for a 2014 Annual Razzie Award (an award show for the worst films), which is well deserved.
On a deeper level, this film reflects the mainstream attitude in the United States toward the DPRK. There is near total lack of trust between the two countries. This film attempts to send a message to audiences that everything in DPRK is an illusion. Everything from a fully-stocked supermarket to a fat boy standing on the street with a lollipop in hand is merely a façade. One who has been to the DPRK will find that lot of scenes and plots are wildly fictitious and unrealistic. Epictetus, a famous Stoic philosopher of ancient Rome, said: men are disturbed not by things, but by the views they take of them. Doubt is like a seed, once it has taken root, it then sprouts, interfering with your thinking and affecting your judgment.
With regards to international relations, this film has shown that the dark side of U.S.-DPRK relations has expanded. In the past, the major concern for the United States was DPRK’s nuclear program. Subsequently, the human rights issue came into focus. Now, however, the sensitivity of the film has dragged the issue of cybersecurity right back under the U.S. domestic spotlight. I would argue that if the U.S. tries to handle the DPRK’s nuclear, human rights, and cyber security issues using a three-pronged, mutual alliance approach, the U.S.-DPRK relationship will grow more complex and dire. Subsequently, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral partnership could adjust to become closer or more strained, depending on the ROK’s attitude.
Coincidentally, three days after watching the film, I attended one of the first events of the New Year at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The various Asia programs at CSIS (China, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, and India), as well as the political economy program, jointly issued a new strategic research report: “Pivot 2.0: How the Administration and Congress Can Work Together to Sustain American Engagement in Asia to 2016.” The Korea Chair, former U.S. National Security Council director for Asian affairs, Victor Cha, predicted that in the next two years, circumstances on the Korean peninsula would necessitate a strengthening of the Japan-South Korea bilateral alliance, as well as the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance. These alliances, however, are not just aimed at preventing tension on the Korea issue, but also to “guide the rise of China as a force for shaping the rules, rather than revisionism.” It is foreseeable that as the Unites States promotes its rebalancing strategy in 2015, it will continue to return to DPRK as an important and convenient excuse, but not as a serious negotiating partner. The rapid thawing of U.S.-Cuba relations cannot be cross-applied to U.S.-DPRK’s relations without great difficulty. The reasons are manifold:
First, the American government launched the negotiations for normalization of diplomatic relations. Regardless of whether an embassy will be built in Havana in the coming months, this is already become a major highlight of Obama’s diplomatic legacy. Even if a breakthrough in U.S.-DPRK relations occurs and becomes another achievement, it is improbable that Obama will choose to highlight it.
Second, although it is indisputable that a thawing of U.S.-DPRK relations could be another bright spot in Obama’s foreign policy agenda, due to the strong Republican grip on Congress, the prospects for diplomatic negotiations are difficult to say the least. Thus, Obama is unlikely to willingly shoulder another, even heavier policy burden.
Third, from the vantage point of geopolitics, Cuba is America’s neighbor, and its importance far outweighs that of DPRK, which is several thousand miles away.
Fourth, the public support for Cuba in the United States far exceeds that for DPRK. It should be said that DPRK’s intense criticism of “The Interview” is understandable, since this movie is the equivalent of a worldwide discrediting of DPRK once again.
The final component to examine is the strong economic growth in the United States during the second half of 2014. U.S. GDP growth in Q3 reached 5 percent! With these deep pockets, driven by a new surge in economic strength, will the United States take a harder line with its foreign policy? If Washington-Pyongyang relations are any indication, 2015 looks certain to be filled with confrontation and struggle.
Dr. Bai Jie is a Visiting Fellow from the P.R.C. with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and an analyst with World Affairs Press.
