The Problem with H.R. 4377, the Burma Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2014

By David Steinberg

Burmese Defence Services personnel  receive a Thai delegation in Naypyidaw. Source: Thai's goverment's flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.

Burmese Defence Services personnel receive a Thai delegation in Naypyidaw. Source: Thai’s goverment’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.

This bill, introduced by Congressmen Chabot and Crowley on April 2, 2014, was either drafted in ignorance of the situation in Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), or intended to stop all U.S. assistance to reform the essential power broker in that state — the military. In either case, if passed and implemented in accordance with its own regulations, it would lessen the U.S. position and influence in that country and undercut the very goals of U.S. policy there.

Under this proposed legislation, security funding for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 would cease unless the secretary of state certifies that the Burmese government has taken “concrete steps toward establishing civilian oversight of the armed forces…has amended the constitution and laws to ensure civilian control of the military and implemented reforms to increase the transparency and accountability of the military’s budget and operations, and the Burmese military has taken substantial and meaningful steps to divest itself from ownership of commercial businesses…” Other elements of the law concern human rights issues, elections, and military relations with North Korea.

The military has designed a system under the 2008 constitution that would uphold its principles of national unity and sovereignty and insulate it from external supervision. It has succeeded in holding power for over half a century because, in contrast to other Asian states that were under military rule for various periods, it has controlled all the avenue of social mobility. This is becoming undone with the reforms of the past several years, and especially in the political and economic processes, but change will be slow and uneven. To demand that the United States limit its relationships with the very element of that society that is paramount and needs reformation is, in effect, to limit U.S. influence with the military itself.

The military has long explicitly articulated that it has no trust in the civilian sector, because of past civilian incompetence and corruption in managing the state. That is beginning to change, but to expect immediate transformation of the Burmese civil-military situation into a western model is absurd. To demand that the military give up its control over economic entities, which are in part used as a type of “401 (k)” retirement fund for the military and its units, is to single out Myanmar from Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam, to mention only several countries in which the military controls important economic assets. That such entities need to be publicly audited and reformed is different from the provisions of the proposed legislation.

This legislation indicates an arrogance of power, and ignores the highly nationalistic sentiments in that society. The United States needs to deal with Myanmar’s leaders with dignity, even if the United States regards many aspects of the present situation as unpleasant and some past policies under previous administrations as unconscionable. Consider what U.S. national interests are involved in Myanmar. The United States will not change the Burmese military, which will evolve with assistance but at its own pace and not in accordance with U.S. fiscal years, but the frustrations of that government under the proposed legislation will have an adverse impact on our influence and simply retard reform.

Let us not forget that the International Republican Institute, an organization not known for its pro-Burmese military attitudes and programs, has recently conducted a survey (“Survey of Burma Public Opinion, December 24, 2013-February 1, 2014”) in-country in which 88 percent of respondents indicated that they thought the present Burmese administration was moving in the right direction, 20 percent and 69 percent thought the administration was going a very good job or a good job respectively, and 33 percent were very favorable and 51 percent somewhat favorable to the military. Only 1 percent felt that amending the constitution was the greatest problem facing the society.

There is a long, difficult path ahead for Myanmar toward a fair, plural, and just society, but this legislation, for all its moralistic language and tone, will retard that process.

Perhaps we ought to listen and try to understand what is going on there?

Professor David I. Steinberg is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University and Visiting Scholar, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He has written six books on Burma/Myanmar and authored over 50 published articles/chapters on that country. This post was first published in the Nelson Report on May 5, 2014. It is re-posted here with permission.

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