By John Juenemann
A Philippine and Australian Special Operations Forces soldier wait to conduct high-altitude low-opening jumps with U.S. forces at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines during Balikatan excercises on May 7, 2014. Source: PACOM’s flickr photostream, U.S. Government Work.
In light of China’s aggressive posturing in the South China Sea, the Philippines has stepped up defense cooperation with a number of other countries that share its concerns about China, including Australia, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam. The Philippines is also reportedly discussing a multilateral Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
While U.S.-Philippine security relations have become much more robust in recent years, the United States should be glad that the Philippines is looking to diversify its defense partnerships. Stronger regional security ties could bolster the credibility of Philippine defense capabilities and help it build a coalition of regional stakeholders in the face of Chinese violations of international law in the South China Sea.
President Benigno Aquino has been a strong supporter of Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s plans to expand Japan’s security role in Southeast Asia. For Manila, boosting defense cooperation with Japan has yielded tangible benefits. During his visit to Japan in June, the Japanese government finalized an agreement to transfer new patrol boats to the Philippines, and the two sides committed to begin discussions on a VFA. The Philippines already has VFAs with Australia and the United States. Japan is also in talks to provide the Philippines with maritime patrol aircraft.
The Philippines and the United States in April 2014 signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which if passed, would allow greater numbers of U.S. troops, ships, and planes to access Philippine bases on a rotational basis. It would also allow the United States to preposition equipment in the Philippines and, most importantly, to upgrade infrastructure at Philippine military facilities used by both countries’ forces. The EDCA is currently stalled in the Supreme Court amid challenges to its constitutionality and questions about whether it requires approval from the Philippine Senate. Defense Minister Voltaire Gazmin and other Philippine officials have said they expect a favorable ruling soon.
The Philippines has also stepped up its naval exchanges and defense cooperation with Vietnam. The two countries are expected to establish a strategic partnership by the end of the year.
For the Philippines, which has a dilapidated navy and air force, extremely weak coast guard, and inward-focused army, developing ties with any external partners that share its regional security objectives but possess superior military capabilities is necessary to realize its goal of a minimum credible defense.
What does this mean for Washington?
Recent developments have seen Manila strengthen its relations with other U.S. allies and important partners in the Asia Pacific. Japan and Australia, both of which are U.S. treaty allies, have become vital defense partners for the Philippines on the maritime security front. Meanwhile, Philippines-Vietnam relations have grown much closer in what could be a positive development for Southeast Asia. Vietnam is another country that overwhelmingly welcomes an increased U.S. military presence in the region, according to the latest Pew Global Attitudes released in June.
Manila’s own coalition building can be valuable to U.S. strategic interests as Washington seeks to create a network of partners that share the objectives of preserving freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and ensuring disputes are resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law. Beijing has repeatedly complained about what it sees as growing U.S. interference in the South China Sea disputes, but will have a harder time pushing back against coordinated actions by a wider array of regional stakeholders.
Furthermore, by forging wider security partnerships with states that share a common goal of upholding the international rule of law in the South China Sea and the region write large, the Philippines can only help stabilize the U.S. rebalance. When President Barack Obama visits the Philippines in November to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, he and Aquino should hold a joint meeting with leaders from Australia, Japan, and Vietnam to discuss how the group can coordinate their strategies on the South China Sea. While it may not serve the United States to be the mediator in the South China Sea disputes, Washington can and should work with allies and partners to align these countries’ goals and policies into a more unified strategy that aims to uphold international norms in the Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. John Juenemann is a researcher with the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS.
