By Dongwon Kim

On October 23, 2014, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and United States will hold the 46^th annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Washington D.C. where both sides will make a final decision on the delay of the war-time operational control (OPCON) transfer. The OPCON transfer, which has already been delayed once in 2010 under the previous Lee Myung-bak government, has reemerged as an important bilateral issue after the Park Geun-hye government formally requested in 2013 for a further delay beyond the current 2015 schedule because of the precarious security environment following North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013 and their continued hostile posture.

Many concerns have been raised about OPCON transfer, including South Korean military’s readiness and its potential ramifications on the future U.S.-ROK alliance system. More importantly, the appropriate timeline and conditions of the transfer, if the OPCON transfer is delayed again, is important to the both countries. After a number of consultative meetings, the United States and South Korea are aiming to finalize this issue in the upcoming SCM meeting.

Although South Korean forces were given extra time after the first delayed OPCON transfer to enhance defense capabilities, security breaches in the past few years have raised doubts in public opinion and trust toward the plan. In 2012, a North Korean soldier managed to cross the heavily-guarded demilitarized zone (DMZ) undetected and entered a South Korean army barrack to ask for defector status. In early April 2014, the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK confirmed that three North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles had slipped through South Korean air defenses and taken hundreds of aerial photos of key government sites and military bases around the country. These incidents have certainly exposed some gaps in South Korea military’s readiness to defend against the North.

If South Korea seeks to have indigenous capability to protect its population against the North’s aggressive actions, they may need to reexamine not only their conventional weapons power, but also rigorously evaluate whether their soldiers are adequately combat ready. Fortunately, the ROK’s Ministry of National Defense has called for intensive structural as well as morale reforms throughout all units as a response to recent incidents in the South Korean army.

Despite some unresolved issues, OPCON transfer offers opportunities for both countries. The South Korean military is incentivized to demonstrate a ROK-led enhanced joint defense strategic capability while the U.S. can benefit from an ally with more deterrence and defense capabilities. If done correctly, it is a “win-win” strategy for both South Korea and the United States. Determining an appropriate measure of the transfer, however, remains a key element in the process and assessing the aftermath of the transfer will be crucial.

The OPCON transfer is entangled with much-debated dilemmas. After investing tremendous effort and resources into completing this transition, will the ROK forces be able to effectively maintain their readiness and deter the North’s aggression without the structure that existed under the current Combined Forces Command? How will the transfer affect insecurity on the peninsula and what influence will it have on prolonged tensions between the two Koreas? The importance of conducting a proper and secure transition cannot be stressed enough, and should take precedence over a preoccupation with the transfer’s deadline and costs.

A successful war-time Operational Control transfer will function as a significant stepping stone to enhance the U.S.-ROK alliance. If South Korea is not properly prepared to take this step, that leaves space for North Korea to escalate its provocations. The importance of the OPCON transfer means getting it right. Both nations’ efforts will not only be rewarded with more advanced South Korean deterrence capability, but with also a strong message to North Korea. It is not a question of when, but rather how to accomplish a seamless working defense structure on the Korean peninsula that will defend the security interests of both nations in the face of growing security challenges in the region.

Mr. Dongwon Kim is a research intern with the Korea Chair at CSIS.