The Importance of U.S.-Thai Security Cooperation Pre-Coup, Post-Coup, & Beyond

By Desmond Walton

Members of the Royal Thai Army, Singapore armed forces, Malaysian armed forces, and U.S. Army and Air Force stand in formation during a dedication ceremony Feb. 19 at Ban Sa la Kai Fub School as part of Exercise Cobra Gold 2014 in Sukhothai province, Kingdom of Thailand. Source: PACOM's flickr photostream, U.S. Government Work.

Members of the Royal Thai Army, Singapore armed forces, Malaysian armed forces, and U.S. Army and Air Force stand in formation during a dedication ceremony Feb. 19 at Ban Sa la Kai Fub School as part of Exercise Cobra Gold 2014 in Sukhothai province, Kingdom of Thailand. Source: PACOM’s flickr photostream, U.S. Government Work.

The United States and Thailand enjoy deep and mutually beneficial security cooperation that has endured over six decades and has contributed significantly to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, that relationship has been periodically disrupted by the Thai military’s intervention in the country’s contentious politics and by the resulting U.S. policy responses. This happened again most recently in May 2014.

These interruptions have altered the trajectory of the U.S.-Thai security relationship, preventing it from reaching optimal levels. In a dynamic region and in the midst of the U.S. rebalance toward the Asia Pacific, under-performing U.S.-Thai security cooperation is a strategic liability for both governments and for the region as a whole.

Born out of the aftermath of World War II, U.S.-Thai security cooperation was quickly subsumed by the Cold War and became focused exclusively on combating the spread of communism in Asia. Vast quantities of U.S. funding, equipment, and training underwrote the Thai defense establishment. In return, Thailand performed as a loyal ally during the Cold War, committing troops to Korea and Vietnam and granting critical access to U.S. forces.

As the threat of communism ebbed, bilateral exercises with visiting U.S. forces, scholarships for military training in the United States, and cash-based foreign military sales replaced the huge subsidies of military aid that had flowed freely for decades.

The benefit to the United States of an outwardly-focused and capable Thai military is obvious: in a strategically critical region and in a world where challenges to security continue to proliferate, the United States needs capable partners to help tackle threats to stability. Thailand’s relatively robust defense spending and decades of interoperability training with the United States have enabled the Thai military to build capabilities in many areas relevant to the United States and regional security.

The Thai Air Force’s fleet of 12 C-130 transports gives it significant tactical lift capacity, while the Navy’s Aungthong Landing Platform Dock adds an important capability to Thailand’s maritime forces. In a region fraught with natural disasters, Thailand’s air and sea capabilities play an important role in regional responses, thereby reducing the region’s historic dependence on U.S.-led disaster relief efforts. The Thai military is also making contributions farther abroad, including peacekeeping (recently in Sudan) and anti-piracy (a Thai admiral recently commanded the combined taskforce in the Gulf of Aden).

Yet U.S. and Thai expectations regarding the strategic purpose of the relationship in the post-Cold War era have not been sufficiently harmonized, leaving both sides disappointed at times. This is certainly true regarding the present unwillingness of the United States to condone Thai military intervention in domestic politics. While earlier coups had been treated as routine Thai politics, current U.S. and Thai views could not diverge more widely.

While the United States is in principal opposed to the military’s overthrow of legitimately elected governments, the Thai military views itself as the legitimate guardian of Thai sovereignty, stability, and most importantly, the monarchy. It remains to be seen whether differing Thai and U.S. viewpoints can be fully reconciled – an important precondition for the relationship to reach its full potential.

In the two years prior to the coup, U.S. and Thai officials made notable progress harmonizing expectations on the scope and underlying purpose of the defense relationship. The most important step was the resumption of the high-level defense dialogue between the two militaries in October 2012. This meeting helped shape the agenda for Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s visit to Thailand a month later during which he and his Thai counterpart signed a joint vision statement that reoriented the purpose of the alliance toward regional and global cooperation to face common security challenges. Remarkably, this was the first formal update of the alliance since the Thanat–Rusk agreement of 1962.

However, the May 2014 coup precipitated an immediate curtailment of U.S.-Thai security cooperation. The heady days of 2012-2013 followed by the military takeover have prompted deep reflection on the future of U.S.-Thai security cooperation. The achievements leading up to the coup speak to the strategic opportunities that exist in a revitalized U.S.-Thai alliance.

Thailand also offers the United States a unique opportunity to foster regional multilateral security cooperation. Thailand’s gift to the region is its willingness to facilitate and host multilateral security activities. Thailand routinely sets aside concerns about national sovereignty and the legal status of visiting forces to host multiple multilateral security cooperation events every year, including Cobra Gold. Thailand is unquestionably the regional leader in this area.

Last year’s coup prompted a thorough assessment of U.S. participation in Cobra Gold. Significant adjustments were made to the scope and focus of this year’s exercise, but the biggest takeaway was a renewed appreciation for the strategic significance of the exercise. Cobra Gold, a 32-year-old institution encompassing 24 participating nations in 2015 including India and China, is clearly the Asia Pacific’s marquee multilateral security event.

Additionally, Thailand has facilitated trilateral cooperation between the armed forces of the United States, China, and Thailand in the field of military medicine. In 2013, Thailand hosted a trilateral conference on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with military officials from the United States and long-isolated Myanmar.

Obviously, the coup makes it difficult for this vital partnership to reach its full potential. Once Thailand has successfully navigated its political reform process, it will be important for both countries to address the inevitable deterioration that has occurred during this interim period. The most important step will be the rapid resumption of discussions between senior leaders from both sides that will produce the strategic guidance necessary to craft a mutually agreeable way ahead to bring the relationship back to its optimal level.

Colonel Desmond Walton was the U.S. defense attaché in Bangkok, Thailand, until June 2015. He previously served as the director for Southeast Asia in the National Security Council.

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1 comment for “The Importance of U.S.-Thai Security Cooperation Pre-Coup, Post-Coup, & Beyond

  1. Suriyon Raiwa
    July 18, 2015 at 23:07

    It is a source of dismay to learn that someone with views like those of COL Walton could serve on the NSC staff. The article reads like a rather clever argument for winking an eye at further repression in Thailand. It characterization of the political orientation of the Thai military is superficial, and its tacit acceptance of (what it understands of) that orientation reflects a sorry unfamiliarity with Thai history. There are good reasons for and good approaches to safeguarding the Thai-US mil-to-mil (and intelligence) relationship, even in these bad times, but one will not find them in this article, alas.

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