How to Keep the Peace in China’s Not-So-Peaceful Rise

By Thomas Jandl

Source: Wikimedia user MikeRussia, used under a creative commons license.

Sunset on the South China Sea off Mũi Né village on the southeast coast of Vietnam. Source: Wikimedia user MikeRussia, used under a creative commons license.

China’s peaceful rise is over. Beijing’s recent aggressive behavior in the oceans to its south and east give the lie to the previously cultivated narrative. China’s claims to vast stretches of open water are not grounded in international law, nor is the use of force in creating new realities acceptable. China knows this and therefore rejects appeals to international tribunals, even though it is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In the most recent spat over a Chinese oil rig placed within an area of Vietnam’s claimed 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone that can at best be called disputed, videos show large Chinese ships ramming and in one case brutally sinking a small Vietnamese fishing boat. Clearly, China is not pulling punches.

Beijing’s attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies in East Asia has failed. Washington has confirmed it would come to the defense of treaty allies Japan and the Philippines in case of war. The emphasis now is on preventing the outbreak of open hostilities in waters that carry over one third of global shipping. World leaders are concerned that this local spat is a prelude – if not countered effectively and early on – for an ever more aggressive China.

Clearly for both Vietnam and China there can be little compromise over territorial claims – whoever budges faces the wrath of the people. Vietnam is trying hard not to be pulled into a war it cannot win, but the leadership may prefer to shed blood in a conflict with China than in one with its own irate people. Under these conditions, a game of chicken can quickly turn deadly.

This standoff makes Taiwan an instructive history lesson. Taiwan represents a more vital interest for China than any maritime claim. No leader in Beijing could accept the loss of the island and survive in power. Yet China has found that a make-believe attitude brings economic and geopolitical advantages without unacceptable loss of face. Beijing pretends Taiwan is a province and neither Taiwan nor its U.S. ally openly objects. The United States guarantees Taiwan’s security as long as Taipei plays along and does not declare independence. With no side willing to alter a status quo that prevents war, the illusion has turned into a mutually beneficial arrangement. Far from preparing for invasion, China rolls out the red carpet for investment and trade opportunities across the straights. All parties know that Taiwan is running its own affairs, but as long as nobody makes noise about it, everybody can live with the situation.

The South China Sea dispute could only be contained in a similar manner. China and its neighbors would maintain their claims, but refrain from provocations. Exploitation could take place in joint ventures, officially only to share risk and cost. While this sounds utopian at the moment, who would have thought a couple of decades ago that Taiwanese businesspeople would fly non-stop to the mainland to manage their factories there?

Would such an arrangement satisfy China’s policy objectives? Probably not, but at this point China is in retreat and needs to save face. The United States could offer China a symbolic victory of sorts by taking a position as guarantor of the status quo in the area, against any violator, not only against China. U.S. presence would be required, but would have to be light enough to allow China to pretend that Washington is not running the show, and come with frequent reminders that the goal is to prevent all sides from making unilateral moves. Washington would not draw lines in the sand – or water – but maintain strategic ambiguity, as it did in the case of Taiwan.

The United States is unlikely to enter the China-Vietnam fray officially by signing a defense treaty with Vietnam, but it could initiate joint piracy patrols and search-and-rescue missions with Vietnamese maritime forces. It could also lift its embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam without necessarily engaging in such sales right away. The designated ambassador to Hanoi, Ted Osius, has told Congress he is open to such a move.

If neither side wins outright but both can claim vis-à-vis their own constituencies that they have not lost anything, reality on the ground can slowly turn into economic cooperation. Once joint exploitation brings benefits to all parties and the nationalist fervor is kept at a simmer – because nobody concedes defeat – the South China Sea will effectively turn into the international waters that it should legally be. The United States must play the role of low-key police officer. That will not please Beijing, but just like accepting the fiction of “Taiwan, province of China,” it is the most acceptable outcome among a number of unpalatable options. And China can go back to its policy of challenging the United States in East Asia not through the military stick – which has been a monumental failure – but the economic carrot.

Dr. Thomas Jandl is a Scholar in Residence at American University. He is the author of Vietnam in the Global Economy: The Dynamics of Integration, Decentralization and Contested Politics.

Share

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *