How Should the United States Respond to Thailand’s Election Delay?

By Joshua Simonidis

Royal Thai Army soldiers in front of the Democracy Monument in Bangkok, Thailand. Source: Pittaya’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.

Royal Thai Army soldiers in front of the Democracy Monument in Bangkok, Thailand. Source: Pittaya’s flickr photostream, used under a creative commons license.

Two members of Thai prime minister Prayuth Chan-ocha’s cabinet, Finance Minister Sommai Phasee and Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, recently said Thailand’s return to civilian rule, originally planned with elections held toward the end of 2015, may now take up to “a year and a half.”

Many observers have been skeptical of the military junta’s commitment to return to democracy, and this latest statement has further fueled their uncertainty. This skepticism is not unfounded. The new requirement for school children to memorize the “12 core-values” as formulated by Prayuth does not seem like the policy of a government preparing for democratic elections.

The political impasse that has gripped Thailand since the 2006 coup that ousted then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and reached its peak with the latest May 22 coup has put a strain on the historically strong Thai-U.S. relationship.

While the United States largely overlooked Thailand’s seven coups during the Cold War period between 1945 and 1990, it has proven less accepting in recent years. Following the May coup, the United States quickly took punitive measures against Thailand, including by cancelling $3.5 million in military assistance – one third of total U.S. aid to Thailand – and withdrawing U.S. forces from Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises being held in Thailand at the time.

The next step some critics of the coup suggested was the cancellation of Cobra Gold, long considered the most prestigious component of U.S.-Thai engagement. Cobra Gold is a multi-country military exercise hosted jointly by the United States and Thailand and held annually in Thailand. Many called for the event to be cancelled or moved elsewhere in 2015, but after a period of deliberation, the United States opted instead to scale it down by removing live fire exercises and focusing on humanitarian assistance and noncombat operations.

The recent ambiguity regarding elections has once again put U.S. policymakers in a tough spot. There is a desire in Washington to return to full pre-coup levels of cooperation, but the United States cannot do that until there is a clear indication that the Thai government intends to hold elections. In the meantime, is difficult for the United States to spell out a policy toward Thailand while not knowing what could transpire next in the country – and recognizing that elections may take place in 2016 or perhaps later.

The decision to hold Cobra Gold in 2015 was forged with a tentative belief that elections would take place at the end of the year. If that appears to not be the case, the United States should make clear to Thailand it will seriously consider next year relocating Cobra Gold to another country or cancelling it completely, and limit other cooperation in military exercises as well as aid in military-related programs. Many in Thailand were under the impression that Washington did not act very forcefully toward the military during the 2006 coup. The United States suspended military aid and other military cooperation programs, but went ahead with holding Cobra Gold in 2007, before elections were held later that year.

At the same time, the United States should highlight U.S.-Thai cooperation in areas such as law enforcement, health, environment, and people-to-people interactions – whether it is sharing best medical practices, constructing infrastructure, providing development aid, or sending Peace Corps volunteers – whenever possible, despite what the junta decides to do about elections. Thailand is a long-time U.S. ally in the region, but the alliance has been without any new strategic initiatives for a number of years.

Seventy-three percent of Thais hold a favorable view of the United States, according to a 2014 Pew Research survey. The United States should not squander support in what is an important player in Southeast Asia. Thailand will almost certainly return to democracy down the road, and when that happens, the United States needs to be remembered as a country that steadfastly supported democratic values and stood on the side of the Thai people.

Mr. Joshua Simonidis is a researcher with the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS.

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1 comment for “How Should the United States Respond to Thailand’s Election Delay?

  1. December 17, 2014 at 14:57

    I agree with you, Josh, on the stance the U.S. should take to encourage democratic elections in Thailand. However, what specific policy initiatives would you recommend the U.S. (whether through diplomatic channels, the Defense industry, civil society, or the Peace Corps, otherwise) advance to bring about the return to democracy you discuss here?

    Thanks.

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